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Abstract 
In the paper, we re-investigate the long run behavior of an adaptive learning process driven 
by the stochastic replicator dynamics developed by Fudenberg and Harris (1992). It is demonstra- 
ted that the Nash equilibrium will be the robust limit of the adaptive learning process as long as it 
is reachable for the learning dynamics in almost surely finite time. Doob’s martingale theory and 
Girsanov Theorem play very important roles in confirming the required assertion. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The major goal of the present exploration is to study the limiting characteristic of 
an adaptive learning process driven by the stochastic replicator dynamics pioneered 
by Fudenberg and Harris (1992), extended by Cabrales (2000), Imhof (2005), 
Hofbauer and Imhof (2009), and among others. First, it is argued that the adaptive 
learning process indeed provides us with a local-martingale process due to the 
Girsanov Theorem under certain conditions. That is, the adaptive learning process 
exhibits local-martingale property through transforming the original probability 
measure into a new equivalent probability measure under relatively weak assumptions, 
i.e., the well-known Novikov condition is fulfilled. And this naturally leads us to the 
employment and application of Doob’s martingale theory. Second, it is proved that 
any given Nash equilibrium will be learned in the long run by the players equipped 
with adaptive learning mechanism as long as it is reachable for such kind of replicator 
dynamics in almost surely finite time. And it is believed that this assertion rather 
throws new insights into existing convergence studies on stochastic learning dynamics. 
Last but not least, the global convergence is ensured in the sense of uniform topology 
and the corresponding robustness is also demonstrated under reasonable assumptions. 
 
1.1. Related Literatures 
Many existing literatures are encouraged to study the limiting characteristic of 
the learning process depending on different requirements. For example, some literatu- 
res (see, Canning, 1992; Young, 1993; Kandori et al., 1993) proved the similar 
convergence essentially requiring that the errors or perturbations approach zeros. 
Specifically, Canning (1992) shows that, under certain regularity conditions, the 
stationary distribution of the perturbed process converges to a stationary distribution 
of the unperturbed one. Kandori et al. (1993) show that the stochastic evolutionary 
learning process will converge to a Nash equilibrium when the mistake probability is 
small. In his seminal paper, Young (1993) shows that the adaptive dynamics defined 
by random sampling will converge almost surely to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium 
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when the likelihood of mistakes goes to zero. On the contrary, the present model 
emphasizes the importance of evolutionary drift (see, Binmore and Samuelson, 1999) 
and the stochastic perturbations can be arbitrarily different from zeros except that they 
are controlled in certain regions due to the Girsanov Theorem. And also, the 
corresponding limit can be either a pure strategy Nash equilibrium or a mixed strategy 
Nash equilibrium. 
Moreover, it is broadly known that mixed equilibria might interpreted as the 
limits of some learning processes arising from fictitious play with randomly perturbed 
payoffs in the manner of Harsanyi’s (1973) purification theorem (e.g., Fudenberg and 
Kreps, 1993; Kaniovski and Young, 1995; Benaïm and Hirsch, 1999; Ellison and 
Fudenberg, 2000; Hofbauer and Hopkins, 2005, and among others). Nonetheless, 
there exist some crucial problems that prevent the corresponding convergence (see, 
Jordan, 1993). Benaïm and Hirsch’s (1999) study reveals that there are robust 
parameter values giving probability zero of convergence for Jordan’s 3×2 matching 
game. Both Shapley (1964) and Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer (1995) provide 
examples in which the stochastic fictitious play as well as the standard fictitious play 
fail to converge. However, it is worth emphasizing that the present assertion can be 
easily extended to include asymmetric games between heterogeneous groups of 
populations and the corresponding global convergence indeed does not depend on the 
choice of payoff structures of the games. 
Rather, the basic idea behind the present framework is in line with the argument 
of Gale et al. (1995), Binmore et al. (1995), Börgers and Sarin (1997), Cabrales (2000) 
and Beggs (2002) that the adaptive or trial-and-error learning process can be 
reasonably approximated by replicator dynamics. And in existing studies, Imhof 
(2005) proves that if the population is in a state sufficiently near to a strict Nash 
equilibrium, then, with probability close to 1, that equilibrium will be actually 
selected by the adaptive learning process driven by the stochastic replicator dynamics 
in the long run. Theorem 4.1 of Imhof (2008) shows that the expected time average 
distance between the stochastic replicator dynamics and a Nash equilibrium may be 
small provided that the payoff matrix is strictly negative definite. And Imhof (2008) 
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provides us with a sufficient condition, which strictly depends on the specification of 
the payoff matrix, under which the stochastic replicator dynamics converge to a strict 
Nash equilibrium almost surely. Moreover, Hofbauer and Imhof (2009) provides us 
with an averaging principle, i.e., the time average of the learning dynamics will 
converge to the unique interior Nash equilibrium of the randomly perturbed game 
almost surely and under certain assumptions. To summarize, one major innovation, 
when compared with the above explorations, is that a unified framework is supplied 
such that either pure strategy Nash equilibrium or mixed strategy Nash equilibrium 
can be selected in the long run under much weaker assumptions than that of existing 
literatures. 
 
1.2. Outlines 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the adaptive 
learning dynamics driven by the stochastic replicator dynamics and also some 
necessary assumptions are supplied. Section 3 demonstrates the global convergence of 
the learning dynamics and the corresponding robustness is confirmed under relatively 
weak assumptions. There is a brief concluding section. All proofs, unless otherwise 
noted in the text, appear in the Appendix. 
 
2. THE MODEL 
Here, and throughout the current investigation, we will focus on an asymmetric 
two-player game, which is canonical in evolutionary game theory, with n  pure 
strategies, and we denote the corresponding payoff matrix by ( )ij n nA a  . Naturally, 
for any two sampled players, they enjoy the same strategy space and for each of the 
two players, ija  represents her payoff from using strategy i  if her opponent 
employs strategy j . As usual, we will study the evolutionary game by employing the 
replicator dynamics, which approximately describes the law of motion of the 
proportions of strategies over any given population. And the population is assumed to 
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be sufficiently large with every member programmed to play one of her pure 
strategies in each period. Now, let ( )iZ t  denote the number of i  strategy players at 
time t , and let 
1
( ) ( ) ( )
n
i i jjX t Z t Z t   denote the corresponding proportion. Thus, 
 ( ) iAX t  will be the expected payoff to those individuals playing strategy i  under 
the random matching mechanism and with 1( ) ( ( ),..., ( ))
T
nX t X t X t . In what follows, 
following Fudenberg and Harris (1992), Imhof (2005), and Hofbauer and Imhof 
(2009), we will incorporate random perturbations, which is modeled by independent 
Gaussian white noises with intensities 21 , … , 2n , into the game payoffs. Thus, we 
put, 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i iidZ t Z t AX t dt dW t    , 1,2,...,i n .                    (1) 
where, 
1 1
1
1
( ) ( ( ),..., ( )) ( ( ),..., ( ))
( )
T T
n nn
ii
X t X t X t Z t Z t
Z t
  . 
and also 1( ( ),..., ( )) ( )
T
nW t W t W t  denotes an n  dimensional Brownian motion 
defined on the underlying stochastic basis ( , , )T   for 0T  . Hence, by 
applying the Itô’s rule to (1), the evolution of the population state ( )X t  is driven by 
the following stochastic replicator dynamics, 
( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( )dX t b X t dt C X t dW t  , 0(0)X x .                        (2) 
where, 
2 2
1 1( ) ( ,..., ) ( ,..., )
T
n nb x diag x x xx A diag x          . 
and, 
1 1( ) ( ,..., ) ( ,..., )
T
n nC x diag x x xx diag      . 
for   10,1 ; 1nn jjx y y    , and 0 10 0( ,..., ) int( )Tnx x x   . 
ASSUMPTION 1: The existence and uniqueness of the (strong) solution to the 
SDE given by (2) are ensured. 
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We rewrite (2) as follows, 
 ( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( )dX t diag X t F X t dt X t dW t   .                       (3) 
Then, we give, 
ASSUMPTION 2: To ensure that   is invariant, it is supposed that for each x  
 , the drift vector ( ) ( )diag x F x  and the columns 1( ),..., ( )nS x S x  of the diffusion 
coefficient matrix ( ) ( ) ( )S x diag x x  are elements of the tangent space T u    
  10,1 ; 0nn jj u   of  . 
Moreover, inspired by the well-known Girsanov Theorem, we directly give, 
ASSUMPTION 3: Here, and throughout the paper, suppose that there is an equiv- 
alent probability measure   on T  such that ( )X t  defines a local-martingale w. 
r. t.  . 
 
3. GLOBAL CONVERGENCE 
In the present section, we are encouraged to study the convergence property of 
the adaptive learning process driven by the stochastic replicator dynamics. Rather, we 
establish the following theorem, 
THEOREM 1 (Global Convergence): Based upon the above constructions and 
assumptions, it is demonstrated that for any given Nash equilibrium, denoted x   
1( ,..., )
T
nx x
 
, the adaptive learning process will strongly converge to x  a.s. in the 
sense of uniform topology, that is, 
2
0
lim sup ( ) 0
T t T
X t x  
   a.s. 
if we are provided that  ( ) inf 0; ( )t X t x       a.s.. 
PROOF: It follows from Assumption 3 that ( )i iX t x
  defines a local-martingale 
w. r. t.  . And by Assumption 2, 
 ( ) inf 0; ( )N it X t N       a.s. as N  .                    (4) 
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So, ( )i N iX t x    defines a martingale w. r. t.  . Applying Doob’s Martingale 
Inequality implies that, 
0
sup ( ) ( )i N i i N i
t T
nX t x X T x
n
 
 
 
               , 0  , 0T  .   (5) 
Based upon the assumption  ( ) inf 0; ( )t X t x       a.s., put, 
   ( ) ( ) 0; ( ) ( )B             . 
for 0  . Without loss of any generality, set up, 
     2( ) ( ) ( ) 0; ( ) ( ) 2k kB B                 . 
Thus, according to Doob’s Optional Sampling Theorem, Assumption 2, the continuity 
of martingale w. r. t. time t  for any given  , and based on the Lebesgue 
Dominated Convergence Theorem, we obtain for  
2
( ) ( )k
k B      , 
0 ( )
limsup sup ( )
k
i N i
k t
X t x
n 
 
  
       
limsup ( ( ) )ki N i
k
n X x  


      
( ( ) )i N i
n X x  
      , 0  . 
by (5). It follows from Fatou’s Lemma that, 
0 ( )
sup ( ) ( ( ) )i N i i N i
t
nX t x X x
n 
   
  
 
               , 0  . 
i.e., 
0 ( )
limsup sup ( )i N i
N t
X t x
n 



  
       
limsup ( ( ) ) 0i N i
N
n X x  
 

      , 0  . 
by (4) and Lebesgue Dominated Convergence Theorem again. Moreover, applying 
Fatou’s Lemma again shows, 
0 ( )
sup ( ) 0i i
t
X t x
n 



 
      , 0  . 
by (4). This gives rise to, 
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0 ( )
sup ( ) 1i i
t
X t x
n 



 
      , 0  . 
which yields, 
0 ( )
sup ( )i i
t
X t x
n 



 
   a.s. 0  .                                 (6) 
Now, we define the supremum norm, 
 1,...,( ) max ( )i ii nX t x X t x
 
 
  . 
 Thus, one may easily obtain, 
2
0 ( )
sup ( )
t
X t x
 

 
  
0 ( )
sup ( )
t
n X t x
 

 
   
 1,...,0 ( )
sup max ( )i ii nt
n X t x
 

 
   
ˆ ˆ
0 ( )
sup ( )i i
t
n X t x
 

 
   
n
n
   ,  a.s. 
by (6) and for 0  . Notice the arbitrariness of  , we get,  
2( ) 0 ( )
lim sup ( ) 0
t
X t x
    

  
  ,  a.s. 
as required. And hence the proof is complete. ■ 
REMARK 3.1: (i) It is easily seen that the proof of Theorem 1 essentially depends 
on the assumption that  ( ) inf 0; ( )t X t x       a.s. by noting that the local- 
martingale condition is a natural property of the adaptive learning process thanks to 
Girsanov Theorem. Therefore, the economic intuition of Theorem 1 can be concluded 
as follows: one Nash equilibrium can be learned by the players in the long run as long 
as the equilibrium is reachable for the given learning dynamics in almost surely finite 
time. 
(ii) Moreover, it is especially worth emphasizing that if x  stands for a pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium, then we do have  ( ) inf 0; ( )t X t x       a.s., 
which is demonstrated by Theorem 4.3 of Imhof (2005). That is to say, in this case, 
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Theorem 1 is a natural conclusion internally implied by the current learning 
dynamics. 
 
3.1. Robustness 
Note that (3) can be rewritten as follows, 
( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( )dX t X t F X t dt X t X t dW t    .                       (7) 
where   denotes the Hadamard product. Now, we introduce, 
( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( )dX t X t F X t dt X t X t dW t         .                       (8) 
where we have used, 
ASSUMPTION 4: For any 0  , we suppose that, 
22
, ,
sup ( ) ( ) sup ( ) ( )
x x x x
F x F x x x 
   
    
  
   . 
i.e., (8) defines a  perturbation of (7), and   10,1 ; 1nn jjy y      . 
Moreover, we put, 
ASSUMPTION 5: The existence and uniqueness of the (strong) solution to the 
SDE given by (8) are ensured throughout. 
ASSUMPTION 6: To ensure that   is invariant, it is supposed that for each x  
 , the drift vector ( ) ( )diag x F x   and the columns 1( ),..., ( )nS x S x    of the diffusion 
coefficient matrix ( ) ( ) ( )S x diag x x     are elements of the tangent space T u     
  10,1 ; 0nn jj u    of  . 
ASSUMPTION 7: Suppose that there exists a constant K   , sufficiently large, 
such that, 
2 2
2 2
sup ( ) sup ( )
x x
F x x K
 
   . 
Accordingly, the following proposition is established, 
PROPOSITION 1: Provided the above constructions and assumptions, and if 
0(0) (0)X X x   , then we have, 
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2
2
0
lim sup ( ) ( ) 0
T t T
X t X t  
    
  as 0  . 
PROOF: In the Appendix. ■ 
Now, naturally, the following corollary is derived, 
COROLLARY 1 (Robust Convergence): It is clearly asserted that ( )X t  converg- 
es to the Nash equilibrium x  a.s. and in the sense of uniform topology. 
PROOF: Combining Theorem 1 with Proposition 1 easily confirms Corollary 1. 
And hence the proof is omitted. ■ 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
In the current investigation, our major goal is to analyze the limiting behavior of 
the adaptive learning process driven by the stochastic replicator dynamics pioneered 
by Fudenberg and Harris (1992). First, a local-martingale process is implicitly and 
naturally implied by such kind of learning process under certain weak conditions 
thanks to the Girsanov Theorem. So, the corresponding martingale theory developed 
by Doob can be employed to prove the convergence assertion. Second, the main result 
of the paper asserts that one Nash equilibrium can be learned by the players equipped 
with local-martingale learning mechanism in the long run as long as the Nash equilib- 
rium is reachable for the learning process in almost surely finite time. Finally, it is 
proved that the global convergence conclusion exhibits robustness under relatively 
weak assumptions. 
 
 
APPENDIX: Proof of Proposition 1 
It follows from Assumption 2 and 6 that for  2 p   , 0T  , we have, 
2 2
0 0
sup ( ) sup ( ) 1
pp
t T t T
X t X t
   
           
  ,                           (A.1) 
where by Assumption 1 and 5, 
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   0
0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t
X t x X s F X s ds X s X s dW s      . 
   0
0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t
X t x X s F X s ds X s X s dW s           . 
Moreover, suppose that 
2 2
( ) ( )X t X t E   for 0t   and E   . Indeed, one 
just need let E 1 . In what follows, we first define the following stopping times, 
 2inf 0; ( )E t X t E   ,  2inf 0; ( )E t X t E    , 0E E E    . 
By the Young Inequality (see, Higham et al., 2003) and for any 0S  , 
2
2
0
sup ( ) ( )
t T
X t X t
 
   
  
   
2 2
, ,2 2
0 0
sup ( ) ( ) 1 sup ( ) ( ) 1
E E E ET T T or T
t T t T
X t X t X t X t         
              
    
     020 0 220 02sup 1 sup ( ) ( )E pE E Tt T t TSX t X t X t X tp                        
 2
2
21
,
p
p
E ET or T
S
 

   ,                                   (A.2) 
It follows from (A.1) that, 
      2 2
0
1 1
1 sup ( )
E
p
pE
E T p p p
t T
X
T X t
E E E
   
            
    . 
Similarly,   1 pE T E   . So, 
      2,E E E E pT or T T T E             . 
Moreover, we obtain by (A.1), 
 1 22 2
0 0
sup ( ) ( ) 2 sup ( ) ( ) 2
p ppp p
t T t T
X t X t X t X t
   
             
   . 
Hence, (A.2) becomes, 
2
2
0
sup ( ) ( )
t T
X t X t
 
   
  
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    2
2
1
2
0 0
20
2 2( 2)
sup
p
p
E E pt T
S pX t X t
p pS E
 


 
        
 .               (A.3) 
By the Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality, we get, 
    20 0
2
E EX t X t     
   0
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Et
X s F X s X s F X s ds

          
   0
2
0
2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Et
X s X s X s X s dW s

         
   0 2
2
0
2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Et
T X s F X s X s F X s ds
   
     
   0
2
0
2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Et
X s X s X s X s dW s
       
    . 
Taking expectations on both sides, and using Itô’s Isometry, we have for any T  , 
    20 0
20
sup E E
t
X t X t

 
 
     
  
   
0
2
2
0
4 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Et
T X s F X s X s F X s ds
         
    
   0 2
2
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Et
T X s F X s X s F X s ds
     
      
   
0
2
2
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Et
X s X s X s X s ds
      
  + 
   0 2
2
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Et
X s X s X s X s ds
       
      
0 0
2 2
2
2 2
0 0
4 ( ) ( ) ( )
E Et t
TK X s X s ds T X s ds
 

                   
      
0 0
2 2
2
2 2
0 0
( ) ( ) ( )
E Et t
K X s X s ds X s ds
 

               
      
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0
2
2
2
0
4 ( 1) ( ) ( ) ( 1)
Et
T K X s X s ds T T


             
   
   
0
2
0 0 2
0 0
20
0
4( 1) sup 4 ( 1)E E
t s
T K X t X t ds T T

  
 
            . 
where we have used Assumption 2, 4, 6 and 7. Hence, applying Gronwall’s Inequality 
(see, Higham et al., 2003) implies that, 
     20 0 2
20
sup 4 ( 1)exp 4( 1)E E
t
X t X t T T T K

  
 
        
 . 
Inserting this into (A.3) leads us to, 
  2
2
1
2
2
2
0
2 2( 2)
sup ( ) ( ) 4 ( 1)exp 4( 1)
p
p
pt T
S pX t X t T T T K
p pS E



 
        
 . 
Hence, for 0  , we can shoose S  and E  such that, 
12
3
p S
p
   and 
2
2
2( 2)
3p p
p
pS E


  . 
And for any given 0T  , we put   such that, 
  24 ( 1)exp 4( 1)
3
T T T K    . 
Thus, for 0  , we obtain, 
2
2
0
sup ( ) ( )
3 3 3t T
X t X t    
 
       
 . 
Notice the arbitrariness of  , and employ the well-known Levi Lemma gives the 
desired result. And this completes the whole proof. ■ 
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